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EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY FOR 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
ALESSANDRO ROMANO,* LUCA ENRIQUES,** & JONATHAN R. MACEY*** 
Regulators generally have tried to address the problems posed by the excessive 
risk-taking of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) by placing 
restrictions on the activities in which SIFIs engage. However, the complexity of 
these institutions makes such attempts necessarily imperfect. This Article 
proposes to address the problem at its very source, which is the incentives that 
SIFI owners have to push for excessive risk-taking by managers. Building on the 
traditional rule of “double liability,” we propose to modify the current (general) 
rule limiting the liability of SIFI shareholders to the amount of their initial 
investments in such companies. We propose replacing the extant limited liability 
regime with a new system that imposes additional liability over and above what 
SIFI shareholders already have invested in a preset amount that varies with a 
SIFI’s centrality in the financial network. Our liability regime has a number of 
advantages. First, by increasing shareholder exposure to downside risk, it 
discourages excessive risk-taking. At the same time, by placing a clearly defined 
ceiling on shareholders’ total liability exposure, it will not obliterate shareholders’ 
incentives to invest in the ﬁrst place. Second, the liability to which shareholders 
are exposed is carefully tailored to the level of systemic risk that their institution 
creates. Thus, our rule induces shareholders to account for the negative 
externality SIFIs can impose without unduly stifling such financial institutions’ 
role within the financial system and in the wider economy. Third, as the amount 
of liability is clearly defined ex ante using the rigorous tools of network theory, 
our rule minimizes the influence of interest groups and the impact of 
idiosyncratic government decisions. Last, as markets know in advance the 
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amount of liability to which shareholders are exposed, our rule favors the 
creation of a vibrant insurance and derivative market so that the risk of SIFIs 
defaults can be allocated to those who can better bear it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The default of a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) 
imposes significant negative externalities.1 Such a default inevitably 
propagates through the financial system with dramatic and fatal 
consequences for even the most prudently run businesses. It is understood 
that the risk of a national or global economic meltdown attributable to the 
failure of a systemically important financial institution justifies aggressive 
regulation as well as significant departure from ordinary and customary 
corporate governance norms for SIFIs.2 Perhaps the most telling 
manifestation of the public policy implications of being considered 
systemically important is the entrenched policy of governments around the 
world to bail out financially distressed SIFIs, despite the massive costs and 
perverse incentives associated with these bailouts. No one has devised a 
functional plan to enable governments credibly to commit to refrain 
from carrying out such bailouts.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix (2011) (arguing that one of the main 
causes of the 2007 financial crisis was SIFIs’ excessive risk-taking). 
 2. See FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2017), 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Thematic-Review-on-Corporate-
Governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB6Q-87N4] (noting that jurisdictions routinely 
impose additional limitations to the activities of systemically important financial 
institutions); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS 6 (2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L55G-9FTQ] (“SIFIs are expected to have in place the corporate governance 
structure and practices commensurate with their role in and potential impact on 
national and global financial stability.”). 
 3. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced with the specific goal of 
putting an end to bailouts. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; see Stephen J. 
Lubben & Arthur E. Jr. Wilmarth, Too Big and Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205, 1205 
(2017) (“The explicit goal of [the Dodd-Frank Act] is to enable a SIFI to fail . . . .”). 
However, the broad consensus is that the Dodd-Frank has failed to achieve this goal 
and it might even have backfired. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance 
Reform in Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 961 
(2018) (“[T]he predominant bank holding companies remain so large and so 
complex that the legislative claim to have statutorily foreclosed future bailouts lacks 
credibility.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011) (discussing the 
“fundamental weaknesses in the financial regulatory systems”). See generally Roberta 
Romano, Dodd-Frank’s Regulatory Morass, REG. REV., Nov. 10, 2014, 
http://www.theregreview.org/2o14/11/10/romano-dodd-frank-consequences 
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It is well known that the near certainty that SIFIs will be bailed out creates 
acute moral hazard.4 Specifically, SIFI creditors, shareholders, directors, 
and managers, knowing that their firm will be bailed out if too many risky 
investments turn out badly, have incentives to take excessive risk5 and 
refrain from engaging in monitoring.6 To inhibit such excessive risk-taking, 
policymakers consistently pledge that there will be “no more tax-funded 
bailouts.”7 But such pledges are unconvincing because, unlike Ulysses, 
 
[https://perma.cc/38SD-7VH2] (reporting the widely held belief that the Dodd-Frank Act 
“has not resolved the ‘too-big-to-fail’ syndrome. In fact, it could well exacerbate it”). 
 4. See, e.g., HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial 
Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. REG. 1 (2006); Saule 
T. Omarova, The “Too Big To Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2500 (2019) (“The 
well-known notion of ‘moral hazard’ captures the economic inefficiencies associated 
with this implicit subsidy: large firms shielded from the negative consequences of their 
risk-taking have an incentive to take greater risks than they otherwise would.”). 
 5. The term “excessive” is defined with respect to social welfare. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz & Aleaha Jones, Corporate Governance of SIFI Risk-Taking: An International 
Research Agenda, CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOL. (forthcoming 2017–18). 
From a traditional corporate governance perspective, risk-taking would be 
considered excessive if it has a negative expected value to the firm and its 
investors—primarily the shareholders. . . . From a broader perspective, 
however, “excessive” risk-taking might also take into account societal 
consequences. One of us has argued that—at least for SIFIs—traditional 
corporate governance misaligns corporate interests and societal interests, and 
that any assessment of SIFI risk-taking should also take into account systemic 
externalities that could harm the public. 
Id. 
 6. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 490 (2011) (“[I]f either 
or both creditors and shareholders of such a TBTF [too-big-to-fail] institution believe 
they will be made whole in a bailout—or not bear all the losses—they will have a 
reduced incentive to monitor the [TBTF] institution’s risk-taking, and they will not 
demand as great of a risk premium when they extend credit.”). But see Steven L 
Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 761, 765 (2017) (“There is no evidence, much less proof, that [too-big-to-fail] 
causes firms to engage in morally hazardous behavior. Most studies discussing such 
behavior merely assume it without actually offering evidence.”). 
 7. See Transcript of President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing 
of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-
dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act 
[https://perma.cc/2QXV-4CRL]. President Obama stated: 
[B]ecause of this law, the American people will never again be asked to foot 
the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes. There will be no more tax-funded bailouts-
period. If a large financial institution should ever fail, this reform gives us the 
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regulators and politicians cannot credibly tie themselves to the mast.8 
Bailouts are therefore a fact of life.9 
Regulators generally have tried to mitigate SIFIs’ proclivity to engage 
in excessive risk-taking by imposing strict capital requirements and 
placing restrictions on the activities in which SIFIs can engage.10 Yet, 
the high costs and sheer complexity of these regulations make such 
attempts necessarily imperfect.11 This Article proposes an important 
new addition to these standard regulatory approaches by addressing 
the problem at its very source, which is the market-based incentives 
that SIFI owners have to encourage and incentivize excessive risk-
taking by managers. Our proposal is to modify the current practice of 
limiting the liability of SIFI shareholders to the amount of their 
investment in such companies. 
We propose replacing the extant limited liability regime with a new 
system that imposes a fixed and stable amount of potential additional 
liability, over and above what SIFI shareholders already have invested, in 
case the SIFI is resolved or bailed out. By increasing shareholder 
exposure to downside risk, our proposal strongly discourages excessive 
 
ability to wind it down without endangering the broader economy. And there 
will be new rules to make clear that no firm is somehow protected because it 
is “too big to fail.” 
Id. 
 8. Levitin, supra note 6, at 439 (footnote omitted). Professor Levitin argues: 
Law is an insufficient commitment device for avoiding bailouts altogether. It 
is impossible to produce binding commitment to a preset resolution process, 
irrespective of the results. The financial Ulysses cannot be bound to the mast. 
Although we may want Ulysses to be bound to the mast when the sailing is 
smooth to avoid the sirens’ call of politically directed state intervention in the 
market, the situation changes once the ship has hit the rocks. Once the ship 
is foundering, we do not want Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest go down 
[sic] with the ship and drown. Instead, we want to be sure his hands are free 
to bail. The question then, is not whether to have bailouts but how bailouts 
should be structured. 
Id. 
 9. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423–25 
(2012) (discussing the impossibility of “Never Again” for bailouts). 
 10. See, e.g., Alexander W. Salter, Vipin Veetil & Lawrence H. White, Extended 
Shareholder Liability as a Means to Constrain Moral Hazard in Insured Banks, 63 Q. REV. 
ECON. & FIN. 153, 153 (2017). 
 11. Thomas Hoenig, the former vice chairman of the FDIC and the former 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, noted that “[t]he problem is not 
that banks take risk, but that some are too complex for anyone to assess and control 
that risk.” Thomas Hoenig, Why the Sign Must Say: No UBS in the USA, FIN. TIMES, June 
16, 2011, at 11. 
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risk-taking. At the same time, by placing a fixed ceiling on shareholders’ 
total liability exposure, it will not eradicate shareholders’ incentives to 
invest in the first place.12 The advantage of our approach is that, by 
realigning shareholders’ incentives to reduce SIFI risk-taking to more 
societally acceptable levels, it provides a measured and proportionate 
complement to existing, highly imperfect regulatory initiatives to reduce 
excessive risk-taking. Thus, our approach is unique in that it will create 
an operating environment in which bankers with properly aligned 
incentives will voluntarily engage in societally beneficial self-discipline 
and avoid excessive risk-taking in the first place. 
The legal regime of extended liability that we propose for SIFIs is 
different from both unlimited and “classic” limited liability systems. 
Under the former, which is traditionally the rule for general partners in 
partnerships, partners are liable for the partnership’s unsatisfied debts, 
whether deriving from contractual obligations or torts, with no cap on the 
amount of the liability.13 In the classic limited liability system, which has 
been the rule for corporations in the last couple of centuries, 
shareholders are not liable for any of the unpaid corporate debts.14 
Hence, their loss is limited to their investment in the company if it goes 
bankrupt.15 Extended liability is located in between these two extremes 
because shareholders stand to lose more than their investment in the 
company, but their downside exposure is still capped at a preset amount. 
The main claim of this Article is that, for SIFIs, a carefully crafted 
extended liability regime is superior to both unlimited and traditional 
limited liability. To be clear, we do not argue that an extended liability rule 
can induce shareholders to internalize all the possible externalities caused 
by the distress of a SIFI. As we argue in Section II.B, this result is both 
impossible to achieve under any liability rule and undesirable. Instead, the 
more modest goal of our rule is neutralizing the moral hazard created 
by the expectation of SIFI bailouts. 
 
 12. Bainbridge and Henderson note that “there is considerable truth to the widely 
shared view that limited liability was, and remains, essential to attracting the enormous 
amount of investment capital necessary for industrial corporations to arise and 
flourish.” See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50–51 (2016). In Section II.B, we argue that unlimited 
liability would lead to overdeterrence and shrink the size of the financial sector beyond 
what is optimal. 
 13. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 6–7 (1986) (describing the liability 
regime for general partners). 
 14. Id. at 7. 
 15. Id. 
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Extended liability has a long and illustrious tradition in the United 
States. For roughly three quarters of a century, shareholders of banks 
faced a rule of “double liability,” which made them liable for more than 
they had invested in the bank.16 Scholars, including one of us with 
Geoffrey Miller, have argued that it is important to investigate “whether 
double liability—or some variant on the idea—offers promise for coping 
with contemporary problems in the banking industry.”17 We return to this 
question showing that the current features of the financial system 
(namely, the presence of capital ratios for financial institutions, the 
dominance of institutional share ownership, and the availability of well-
developed insurance and derivatives markets) create the perfect 
conditions for implementing a special form of extended liability. Against 
this background, the argument advanced in this Article is then articulated 
in four steps. First, limited liability is inadequate for SIFIs. Second, due to 
the specific features of SIFIs, it is possible to avoid the theoretical and 
practical shortcomings that are usually associated with extending 
shareholder liability. Third, unlimited shareholder liability for SIFIs would 
be inefficient. Fourth, a carefully designed, “network-sensitive” rule of 
extended liability would outperform both limited and unlimited liability. 
The structure of the Article is as follows. Part I explains why it is 
important to ensure that systemically important financial institutions 
do not engage in excessive risk-taking. Moreover, this part sketches the 
proposals that have been advanced by the literature to increase 
shareholders’ liability, and hence reduce their risk propensity. Part II 
explains why the traditional limited liability rule and a regime of 
unlimited liability for shareholders are both undesirable for SIFIs. Part 
III is the core of the Article and describes in detail the liability rule that 
we propose. Part IV tries to anticipate the effect that our liability rule 
would have on equity markets and SIFI ownership. Part V shows how 
traditional objections to unlimited shareholder liability either do not 
apply to our proposed rule or can be easily addressed and outlines how 
shareholders of SIFIs transitioning to the proposed regime could be 
compensated for the losses it imposes on them. Part VI briefly 
concludes by summarizing the main findings of the Article. 
 
 
 
 16. For a discussion of double liability, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double 
Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 31 (1992). 
 17. Id. at 62. 
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I.    THE CHALLENGE OF TAMING SIFIS 
To begin our analysis, we start by explaining why policymakers still face 
a serious challenge in providing for an effective regulatory framework for 
tackling SIFIs and their tendency to engage in excessive risk-taking. Next, 
we briefly review previous proposals to dispense with shareholder limited 
liability. We cover both general recommendations in that direction, 
namely Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s proposal to make 
shareholders liable towards tort creditors,18 and the more recent, post-
crisis suggestions to extend shareholder liability with respect to (some) 
financial institutions, explaining why each of them would be 
inadequate as a tool to prevent SIFIs’ excessive risk-taking. We also 
discuss the double shareholder liability regime which applied to banks 
for a considerable period of U.S. history. 
A.   SIFIs and Interconnections Within the Financial Network 
The recent financial crisis has been a stunning reminder of the fragility 
of the financial system. As its various parts are increasingly intertwined, 
large shocks can quickly propagate throughout the financial system and 
to the real economy with catastrophic consequences.19 National and 
supranational policymakers reacted by tightening up the regulatory 
framework with the aim of minimizing the risk of future financial crises.20 
The main targets of these regulations have been so-called systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs), that is, banks and other 
financial institutions—the failure of which, due to their size and 
interconnectedness, can bring down the entire financial system.21 
Describing the new regulatory framework lies outside the scope of 
this Article,22 but two facts are worth mentioning. First, policymakers 
 
 18. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1990). 
 19. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the 
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797, 847 (2011) 
(defining systemic risk as “the risk that a localized economic shock can have worldwide 
repercussions because of the interconnections between financial institutions”); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008). 
 20. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Financial Regulation: Still Unsettled a Decade After the 
Crisis, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64–70 (2019). 
 21. In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act states, in its preamble, that one of its primary objectives 
is ending the too-big-to-fail problem. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)) (stating that the Dodd-Frank intends to “to end ‘too 
big to fail,’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”). 
 22. For an excellent introduction, see generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
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have significantly expanded the portfolio of regulatory tools to 
preserve financial stability. Before the crisis, most of the regulations 
aimed at ensuring the solvency of the individual financial institutions 
without paying attention to the interconnections among them.23 
Departing from this “microprudential” approach, policymakers have 
now introduced a new family of “macroprudential” policies that 
attempt to protect the financial system as a whole.24 These new policies 
have significantly complicated the regulatory landscape25 and yet have 
not eliminated the risk of a systemic crisis. Regardless of how carefully 
they are devised, ex ante regulations—be they micro or macro—
cannot eliminate systemic risk: “[f]ailure is a fact of economic life.”26 
Moreover, regulators suffer from a chronic lack of information that 
impairs their ability to produce effective policies.27 For instance, leading 
financial economists have suggested that the capital requirements for 
 
 23. See Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 
25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2011) (describing a microprudential approach as “one in which 
regulation is . . . aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial 
institutions”). See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND 
POLICY 310 (2d ed. 2018) (arguing that one of the main problems of the capital 
requirements that were imposed before the crisis was that they did not account for the 
interconnectedness of financial institutions). 
 24. See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to 
Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 881 (2013) (arguing that “the 
culture of financial institutions may lead [a] Board to govern these businesses less 
effectively than boards in non-financial sectors”). See generally Ben Bernanke, 
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation, Remarks 
at the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, (May 5, 2011), in 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P58X-KWCS], at 1 (explaining that the post-crisis legislation 
requires “the Federal Reserve and other financial regulatory agencies adopt a so-called 
macroprudential approach . . . [that] supplements traditional supervision and 
regulation of individual firms or markets with explicit consideration of threats to the 
stability of the financial system as a whole”). 
 25. As noted by Daniel Tarullo, a former member of the Board of Governors of 
the United States Federal Reserve Board, the Dodd-Frank Act alone “called for literally 
hundreds of new regulations, an approach that entailed protracted and often 
complicated rulemakings.” Tarullo, supra note 20, at 70. 
 26. Levitin, supra note 6, at 478 (crises are bound to occur in complex, tightly-
coupled systems, such as the financial system); see Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 102 (2013); see also YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS 6 
(2019) (“[E]ven the best financial regulation is doomed to periodic failure.”). 
 27. See, e.g., JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 579–80 (2016). 
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SIFIs should be greatly increased.28 Capital reserves constitute a 
fundamental buffer that allow banks to be more resilient during times 
of stress, thereby increasing the stability of the financial system.29 The 
higher the capital reserves, the greater the losses banks are able to 
absorb. This is especially true for tier one capital, which includes only 
capital elements of the highest quality.30 But identifying the optimal 
capital requirement for each SIFI requires a level of information that 
regulators simply cannot have. Hence, capital requirements imposed 
by regulators are likely to be either too lax, in which case they fail to 
ensure the stability of the financial system, or too strict, in which case 
they impose unnecessary constraints on SIFIs’ activities.31 Our liability 
rule is an attempt to bypass these informational problems by improving 
the incentives of shareholders on the one hand and by enlisting 
markets in the monitoring of SIFIs’ solvency on the other. 
 
 28. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 79–166 (2013) (discussing 
the social benefits of higher capital requirements). 
 29. Id. at 6 (“Capital regulation requires that a sufficient fraction of a bank’s 
investments or assets be funded with unborrowed money. . . . Having a minimal ratio 
of unborrowed funds relative to total assets is a way to limit the share of assets that is funded 
by borrowing. Because unborrowed funds are obtained without any promise to make 
specific payments at particular times, having more equity enhances the bank’s ability to 
absorb losses on its assets.”); see also Tarullo, supra note 20, at 65 (noting that capital 
requirements “are . . . recognized as an especially supple prudential tool, insofar as they are 
available to absorb losses from sources both anticipated and unanticipated by bankers and 
regulators”). For an overview of capital bank regulation, see RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., 
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 215–69 (5th ed. 2013). 
 30. More precisely, tier one capital is divided in Common Equity tier one capital 
(CET1) and Additional tier one capital. The former is composed of 
qualifying common stock and related surplus net of treasury stock; retained 
earnings; certain accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) elements 
if the institution does not make an AOCI opt-out election . . . plus or minus 
regulatory deductions or adjustments as appropriate; and qualifying common 
equity tier 1 minority interests. . . . [Q]ualifying noncumulative perpetual 
preferred stock, bank-issued Small Business Lending Fund and Troubled Asset 
Relief Program instruments that previously qualified for tier 1 capital, and 
qualifying tier 1 minority interests, less certain investments in other 
unconsolidated financial institutions’ instruments that would otherwise 
qualify as additional tier 1 capital. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Risk Management Manual of 
Examination Policies, § 2.1-3 (2015) https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual 
/section2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JLE-WHPK]. 
 31. See Harry DeAngelo & René M. Stulz, Liquid-Claim Production, Risk Management, and 
Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage Is Optimal for Banks, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 231–33 
(2015) (discussing why exceedingly high capital requirements can impose substantial costs). 
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Second, regulators have attempted to mitigate the moral hazard 
problem created by bailouts. The financial crisis has reminded SIFIs once 
more that they are just too big to fail, and hence regulators are forced to 
intervene if a SIFI is in distress.32 In this vein, anticipating that governments 
will bail them out in case of need, SIFIs have incentives to engage in 
excessive risk-taking, while their creditors have weaker incentives to 
monitor them.33 To prevent this moral hazard problem, regulators have 
attempted to tie their own hands by introducing mechanisms to prevent 
future bailouts. The most important of these mechanisms are the Orderly 
Liquidation provisions in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act,34 which aim to 
facilitate the resolution of large, complex financial institutions by providing 
for a new bankruptcy procedure to be used for bank holding companies 
and their subsidiaries as an alternative to the Bankruptcy Code.35 A failing 
institution is placed in receivership under the control of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).36 The FDIC, under the Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA), has the power to act swiftly in order to 
find a new owner for the “good” parts of the failing institution, with 
access to government money to finance the operations of a “bridge 
bank” until the buyer for the good parts has been found.37 That should 
ensure continuity of operations and therefore avoid the negative 
effects on other financial institutions of a SIFI bankruptcy. 
Yet, serious doubts have been raised as to whether the OLA would 
be sufficient to resolve a major SIFI, such as Bank of America, which is 
not only orders of magnitude larger than any of the commercial banks 
the FDIC usually deals with, but also active across different businesses 
and jurisdictions.38 Even more doubtful is whether the OLA would work 
 
 32. See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS 23–28 (2004) (discussing the too-big-to-fail problem). 
 33. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 6, at 490 (“[I]f either or both creditors and 
shareholders of such a TBTF [too-big-to-fail] institution believe they will be made 
whole in a bailout—or not bear all the losses—they will have a reduced incentive to 
monitor the TBTF institution’s risk-taking, and they will not demand as great of a risk 
premium when they extend credit.”). 
 34. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)). 
 35. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–394 (2012). 
 36. Id. § 5384(b). 
 37. Id. § 5390(h) (describing the functioning and the purpose of bridge financial 
companies). 
 38. See Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 485, 513–16 (2012). The OLA procedure also raises thorny constitutional 
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in the event of a systemic crisis in which the survival of not one, but 
many, if not all, of the existing SIFIs was at stake.39 In such a case, it will 
be virtually impossible to find a buyer for the good parts of the failing 
SIFIs. Moreover, SIFIs’ operating companies may also face illiquidity, if 
not insolvency problems, due to their credit or balance sheet 
interconnections, which may make a government recapitalization the 
only viable solution.40 
Ultimately, committing not to bail out SIFIs is impossible. The 
Darwinian proclivity for survival that characterizes political behavior in 
democracies leads politicians and policymakers to offer bailouts no 
matter how tough the ex ante rules on using taxpayers’ money to prop 
up banks. The immediate political benefits of a bailout, namely, the 
avoidance of the doomsday scenario of a financial and economic 
meltdown, are bound to appear superior to navigating the political 
consequences of such an outcome.41 As noted by the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission, “if you bail out AIG and you’re wrong, you will 
have wasted taxpayer money and provoked public outrage. If you don’t 
bail out AIG and you’re wrong, the whole financial system collapses.”42 
In sum, “[b]ailouts are an inevitable feature of modern economies, in 
which the interconnectedness of firms means that the entire economy 
bears the risk of an individual firm’s failure.”43 Therefore, realistically, 
policymakers should attempt to minimize the moral hazard created by 
bailouts instead of hoping to convince the markets that bailouts will 
not happen in the future. This is exactly what our extended liability 
rule attempts to do. 
 
problems. See Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation 
Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2014) (evaluating the 
constitutional challenges and issues that Dodd-Frank triggers). 
 39. Lubben & Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 1205 (arguing that the resolution 
procedures introduced with the Dodd-Frank Act are “unlikely to work as intended 
during a future global crisis that involves multiple failing SIFIs operating thousands of 
subsidiaries across dozens of national boundaries”). 
 40. See Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, 
(Seton Hall Pub. Law Res. Paper No. 2353035, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353035. 
 41. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial 
Institutions, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 453, 482 (2011); Tarullo, supra note 20, at 69. On 
the special insolvency mechanism, Tarullo notes that “the risks of an untested 
resolution regime are real, and officials may not be willing to take even a modest 
chance that a systemically important firm placed into resolution would implode.” Id. 
 42. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 433. 
 43. Levitin, supra note 6, at 439; see also Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 424. 
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The fact that firms are tightly interconnected has another fundamental 
implication that economists have fully appreciated, although legal 
scholars have sometimes overlooked: the structure of the financial sector, 
and in particular the pattern of connections among financial institutions, 
has a fundamental impact on the stability of the financial system.44 In 
order to study these inter-bank connections and the network they form, 
scholars of different fields have relied on network theory.45 Within the 
framework of network theory, the building blocks of a network are its 
nodes and the connections among them. Thus, if one models the financial 
sector as a network, the banks and the other financial intermediaries 
represent the nodes, while the financial flows among them represent 
the connections.46 One important finding of this strand of literature is 
that, besides size, the position and the level of a financial institution’s 
interconnections also determine its ability to impose negative 
externalities on the financial sector and the economy in general.47 In 
fact, policymakers and economists alike have acknowledged that some 
 
 44. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks, 
105 AM. ECON. REV. 564, 564 (2015) (“Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the view 
that the architecture of the financial system plays a central role in shaping systemic 
risk has become conventional wisdom.”). 
 45. Despite the enormous influence of network theory on many fields, legal 
scholars have generally overlooked its insights, with some exceptions. See Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 325, 325 (2015); Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor 
Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 223 (2019); Alessandro 
Romano, Horizontal Shareholding: The End of Markets and the Rise of Networks (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3255948. For an introduction 
to network theory, see SANJEEV GOYAL, CONNECTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS (2009); MARK NEWMAN, NETWORKS (2d ed. 2018). 
 46. See, e.g., Marco Galbiati, Danilo Delpini & Stefano Battiston, The Power to 
Control, 9 NATURE PHYSICS 126, 126 (2013). 
 47. Robin L. Lumsdaine et al., The Intrafirm Complexity of Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions 1 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2604166 (“While size-based thresholds are appealing from a regulatory 
perspective . . . , they are overly simplistic in the presumption that risk can be evaluated 
via a single value.”); Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo et al., An Empirical Study of the Mexican 
Banking System’s Network and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, 40 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & 
CONTROL 242, 256 (2014) (centrality measures “go beyond size and, in some cases, are 
not correlated or even negatively correlated with the size of an institution”). See Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 699, 706–11, 713–15 (2015) (discussing interconnectedness and substitutability 
of an institution as determinants of the systemic risk it poses). 
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institutions are too interconnected to fail.48 For instance, the Federal 
Reserve rescued Bear Stearns, a relatively small financial institution due 
to its interconnections with other key financial actors.49 
Network scholars have devised various measures to gauge the relevance 
of an individual financial institution for the financial network as a whole, 
that is, its “centrality.” One of the most commonly used measures of 
centrality is known as the DebtRank, which measures the dollar value of 
the harm imposed on the financial system by the distress of a given 
financial institution.50 Notably, the DebtRank can be normalized between 
zero and one, so that it captures the fraction of the financial network (in 
value) that would be affected by the disruption of a node. In a 
companion paper, two of us have argued that insights from network 
theory can and should be used to improve on the effectiveness of financial 
regulation.51 Similarly, we suggest below that measures of centrality 
should be a key component in the development of an extended liability 
regime for SIFI shareholders. Centrality allows policymakers to tailor 
shareholder liability based on the harm that an individual SIFI would 
impose on the financial system if it were to collapse. 
 
 
 48. See, e.g., Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, ‘Too 
Interconnected to Fail’ Financial Network of US CDS Market: Topological Fragility and Systemic 
Risk, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 627, 627 (2012); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission 20 (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
testimony/bernanke20100902a.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZNF8-DHJT] (arguing that the 
status of too-big-to-fail depends also on the complexity, the interconnectedness, and 
the critical functions that a financial institution performs). See generally Michael 
Gofman, Efficiency and Stability of a Financial Architecture with Too-Interconnected-To-Fail 
Institutions, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 113 (2017). 
 49. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial 
Regulators, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.). Chairman Ben Bernanke stated, 
Our financial system is extremely complex and interconnected, and Bear 
Stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets. . . . Given the 
exceptional pressures on the global economy and the financial system, the 
damage caused by a default by Bear Stearns could have been severe and 
extremely difficult to contain. 
Id. 
 50. See e.g., Stefano Battiston et al., DebtRank: Too Central to Fail? Financial Networks, 
the FED and Systemic Risk, 2 SCI. REP., no. 541, 2012, at 1, 1. 
 51. Luca Enriques, Alessandro Romano & Thom Wetzer, Network-Sensitive Financial 
Regulation, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming). 
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B. Other Proposals to Extend Shareholders’ Liability 
Scholars have long acknowledged that firms are able to impose negative 
externalities on society due to the limited liability of their shareholders52 
To address this concern, proposals to extend the liability of shareholders 
have cyclically resurfaced. This Section provides a short overview of some 
of the most influential of these proposals. 
In the modern debate about the merits of limited liability, the first 
scholars to question it as a general rule for corporations were Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman in an article that spurred great 
controversy.53 They noted that shareholders are shielded from liability for 
two kinds of corporate debts: those having a source in contracts and those 
deriving from torts and argued that limited liability is appropriate for the 
former but not the latter.54 In fact, they suggest that contract creditors 
decide to enter in a relationship with the firm and can therefore assess its 
creditworthiness and reliability.55 Moreover, they can contract on the 
appropriate compensation for bearing the risk of default and can include 
clauses to protect themselves from opportunistic behavior on the part of 
the firm.56 Therefore, contractual creditors would not need the additional 
protection deriving from unlimited shareholders’ liability. Instead, tort 
creditors have not consented to enter into a relationship with the firm and 
cannot contract ex ante about risk allocation. As a consequence, 
shareholders can impose consequences on creditors that are not 
internalized via private contracting. Building on these premises, Hansmann 
and Kraakman concluded that, as a matter of general corporate law, 
shareholders should face unlimited liability for tort losses.57 
Their proposal had the great merit of challenging the standard 
assumption that limited liability is an inherent feature of corporations 
and aimed to restore the full force of tort law to tackle externalities. It 
was not meant to tackle the specific problems arising from too-big-to-
fail financial institutions. But it is worth noting here that the kind of 
externalities that tort law addresses are different from the ones 
deriving from the failure of a large financial institution. As we explain 
 
 52. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1879 (noting that limited liability “is 
generally acknowledged to create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting 
corporations to avoid the full costs of their activities”). 
 53. Id. at 1916, 1919–20. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1918–19. 
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in Section II.B, most of SIFIs’ externalities qualify as pure economic 
losses, giving no rise to a tort claim. Hence, Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s proposal for unlimited shareholder liability in torts would 
have little, if any, effect on shareholders’ incentives ex ante. 
Fast forward twenty years, and the financial crisis prompted scholars to 
advance new proposals to extend shareholder liability in order to curb 
SIFIs’ propensity to engage in risky activities. Peter Conti-Brown has 
advocated for the introduction of an “elective” unlimited liability for the 
shareholders of systemically important institutions.58 The gist of his idea is 
that shareholders would be allowed to collectively choose whether they 
want to face unlimited liability for the total cost of their SIFI’s bailout or 
hold higher capital reserves (15 to 20 percent).59 The problems with this 
proposal are two-fold. First, under such a regime, shareholders cannot 
figure out in advance the value of the expected liability because the “total 
cost of bailout” cannot be known ex ante. Hence, they are unable to set 
their level of precautions accordingly. Second, Conti-Brown confronts 
shareholders with a draconian choice: high capital requirements arbitrarily 
set by a regulator with limited information, or a regime of unlimited liability 
based on the unpredictable and idiosyncratic determinations of 
policymakers in times of economic tensions.60 
Steven Schwarcz’s proposal on extended liability focuses instead on 
“shadow banks” only, arguing that their “investor-managers” should face 
a liability that is a multiple of their investment in the firm.61 His proposal, 
however, does not engage with the questions of how to calculate the 
“original investment” in the firm or what the multiple should be. Second, 
his proposal is limited to shadow banking, which Schwarcz defines loosely 
as including “special purpose entities (SPEs), . . . as well as finance 
companies, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, nonbank 
government sponsored enterprises, securities lenders, and investment 
banks.”62 While shadow banks may be big taken together, they represent 
a relatively marginal subset of SIFIs. In fact, since SIFI designation rules 
entered into force, only one such entity has been designated as a SIFI, GE 
 
 58. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 429–31. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Conti-Brown himself admits “bailouts are political decisions—and politics do 
not always play according to economic logic.” Id. at 429. Consequently, under his rule 
also the amount of liability faced by shareholders might be determined without 
following “an economic logic.” Id. 
 61. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking 
Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 28 (2014). 
 62. Id. at 2. 
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Capital Holdings, but its designation was rescinded three years later.63 
Finally, the proposal only extends the liability of “investor managers,” who 
are defined as equity investors who also have “significant power to 
control the firm’s actions.”64 However, this limitation raises the issue of 
defining who has significant power to control the firm’s actions, which 
might not always be straightforward. With a few notable exceptions, 
such as hedge fund management firms and at many institutional 
investors, nobody within the organization will have significant power 
to control the SIFI’s actions. 
Most recently, similar to Schwarcz but with reference to all SIFIs, 
Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra have proposed an extended liability 
regime for all “insiders who have both the information and capacity to 
influence corporate decision-making.”65 In that category, they include, 
in addition to top managers, large shareholders, i.e., those with a stake 
higher than five percent.66 Shareholders with a stake between two and five 
percent should be able to choose whether to be treated as “outsiders” or 
“insiders,” and in the former case, shareholders must commit to not 
exercise their voting rights. Large shareholders should “have double 
liability, i.e. for an additional twice par value of their shares,”67 while insider 
shareholders (those with between two and five percent of voting rights) 
would “be liable to pay in an additional par value of their shares.”68 
Leaving aside the inadequacy of par value as a multiplier for extended 
liability in today’s environment,69 the distinction between large and small 
shareholders under this proposal would seem to be a troublesome solution 
to a relatively minor problem. The solution would be troublesome because 
it would create a disincentive to invest more than the relevant thresholds, 
which may be either self-defeating (if no one crosses the threshold) or such 
that a disproportionate voting power is granted to larger shareholders (if 
many of the insider shareholders opt for passivity). The problem it solves 
 
 63. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/VMW3-8H94]. 
 64. Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 29. 
 65. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Equity Finance: Matching Liability to 
Power 23–27, 29 (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13494, 2019), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk 
/100058/1/Goodhart_CEPR_DP13494.pdf [https://perma.cc/63AA-SMZZ]. 
 66. See id. at 23. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 24. 
 69. See infra Section III.A.1. Goodhart and Lastra write with the U.K. in mind, a country 
where par value is typically not as low as in the U.S., i.e. between one pence and a higher 
fraction of one pound. See Eilís Ferran, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 18 (2008). 
984 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:967 
 
is to avoid “the unfairness, and political unpopularity, of bankrupting 
innocent, uninformed and powerless outside shareholders.”70 This 
outcome would be highly unlikely in today’s equity markets, where most 
individuals do not invest directly in equity shares. And those who do would 
be unlikely to face financial ruin so long as liability is extended but not 
unlimited. In addition, very small shareholders would be unlikely to be 
sued at all for liability because it would not be cost-effective anyway. 
The closest antecedent to our liability rule proposal is in legislation: 
for roughly three quarters of a century, shareholders of American 
banks were subject to double liability.71 More precisely, they were liable 
for an amount in excess of their investment up to the par value of their 
stock.72 Empirical studies confirmed that double liability was effective 
in reducing banks’ risk-taking.73 Reviving this rule “as it was” would be 
problematic. On the one hand, par value has become a meaningless 
measure of the value of a stock.74 On the other hand, because of its 
one-size-fits all approach, the expected liability faced by the shareholders 
under a hypothetical double liability rule for SIFIs would not vary with the 
size of the negative externalities that their SIFI can create and would thus 
imperfectly mold shareholder incentives. 
II.    WHY EXTENDED LIABILITY? 
In this Part, we discuss why both traditional limited liability and 
various versions of an unlimited liability regime for SIFI shareholders 
are not, or would not be, optimal. 
A.   Why Limited Liability Is Inappropriate for SIFIs 
Limited liability has been the standard for U.S. corporations for over 
150 years.75 If only for that reason, a strong justification is needed for 
any deviation. This Section provides support for the proposition that 
limited liability should not apply to SIFIs. Let us recall that a SIFI default 
can have dramatic consequences on the financial system and ultimately 
on the entire economy. The SIFIs’ shareholders will internalize only a 
 
 70. Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 65, at 27. 
 71. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 31. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Benjamin C. Esty, The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk 
Taking, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 189 (1998); Richard S. Grossman, Double Liability and Bank 
Risk Taking, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 143, 143 (2001). 
 74. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 75. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 
604 (1986). 
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small fraction of such losses. Moreover, in order to prevent such a 
fallout, and no matter what the statutes say about never again using 
taxpayers’ money to save financial institutions, the government will be 
forced to bail out the SIFI.76 As the SIFI shareholders and creditors are 
aware of that, the former will favor excessively risky strategies while the 
latter will fail to guard against them.77 This moral hazard problem is 
further worsened because shareholders are unlikely to be completely 
wiped out during a bailout. Hence, shareholders are likely to bear an 
even smaller fraction of the losses caused by the distress of their SIFI. 
There are a number of reasons to believe that the expected value of 
a bailout for the shareholders is larger than zero. First, as a matter of 
historical fact, the average shareholder has received a positive payoff 
from bailouts. Even the bailout of AIG, which was litigated for being 
exceedingly harsh on shareholders,78 actually prevented holders of 
AIG common stock from being wiped out.79 Intuitively, politicians will 
prefer to intervene too early rather than too late. After all, they act to 
avoid the catastrophic effects of a systemic meltdown that may easily 
cause a serious recession and cost them re-election; thus, they are 
unlikely to wait until the very last moment when such are the stakes. 
Hence, they will tend to inject money into SIFIs when shareholders still 
own valuable shares thereby leaving them in place. 
There is an even more fundamental reason to believe that the 
expected value of government aid for SIFI shareholders cannot be 
zero, namely, that alternatives to a bailout have a positive expected 
value for shareholders. Consider, for instance, the case of “regulation 
by deal,” in which a healthy firm is assisted by the government in the 
acquisition of a defaulting SIFI. Examples of this practice during the last 
financial crisis are ubiquitous and involved defaulting financial 
institutions, such as Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch on one side and JP 
 
 76. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
 77. Note that while the problem is more severe for SIFIs due to their unique ability to 
impose large negative externalities and to the prospects of bailouts, limited liability can 
induce in excessive risk-taking in every firm. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2010). 
 78. See Aaron M. Kessler, U.S. Appeals Bailout Ruling That A.I.G. Bailout Terms Were 
Too Harsh, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/ 
business/dealbook/us-appeals-ruling-that-aig-bailout-terms-were-too-harsh.html. 
 79. Mary G. Patterson, Starr International Co. v. United States: The AIG Bailout 
Ruling, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 19, 24 (2015) (“Despite its harsh terms, however, the 
Credit Agreement successfully prevented AIG from going bankrupt, and in turn, 
avoided the otherwise inevitable complete loss of investment return for all AIG 
common stockholders.”). 
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Morgan and Bank of America as their saviors, on the other.80 An 
intervention of this kind clearly has a positive value for the shareholders 
of the acquired firm because they can sell their shares to the aided 
acquirer instead of being wiped out completely. Most importantly, as the 
shareholders know that by opposing the merger they can impose a large 
externality on the economy, they are likely to extract a high price for 
shares that might otherwise be almost worthless.81 In short, it is 
extremely unlikely that the expected value of government aid for SIFI 
shareholders can be set to zero. 
Having established that the benefit of a bailout to shareholders tends 
to be higher than zero, it becomes even clearer why limited liability 
cannot be an adequate rule for SIFIs. A fundamental principle of 
modern corporations is that investors risk what they have invested in 
the company: when the expected value of government aid is positive, 
this principle is violated. Most importantly, it is violated exactly by 
those firms, like SIFIs, that have the potential to impose the greatest 
negative externalities on the economy. As noted above, this can result 
in moral hazard problems and induce shareholders (and creditors) to 
favor excessively risky strategies.82 Extended liability aims to restore this 
axiom and prevent this moral hazard problem. 
B.   Why Not Unlimited Liability? 
This Section explores why shareholders should not face unlimited 
liability. The first step is defining exactly which losses shareholders would 
internalize if unlimited liability was the rule. While at first glance trivial, 
this task becomes very problematic in this context. To clarify this point, 
we divide the losses caused by the distress of a SIFI into three categories: 
losses to creditors, the cost of the bailout, and other externalities.83 
To begin with, SIFI shareholders could be liable for the losses 
experienced by contract creditors in addition to tort creditors. 
However, unlimited liability towards contract creditors is opposed even 
by the staunchest supporters of the idea of extending the liability faced 
 
 80. Yair Listokin & Inho Andrew Mun, Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial 
Crisis, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 349, 366–77 (describing, in greater detail, instances of 
regulation by deal). 
 81. Id. at 369–74 (describing the hold-up problem created by regulation by deal 
and providing the Bear Stearns merger as an example). 
 82. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 83. These categories of losses are, of course, interconnected. For instance, a large 
bailout is likely to reduce creditors’ losses and the other externalities. 
2020] EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 987 
 
by shareholders.84 Unsurprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, nobody 
has ever explicitly advocated for an extension of liability towards contract 
creditors. The basic reasons are that creditors that want higher guarantees 
can simply contract around limited liability and that the interest rate will 
incorporate the level of liability chosen by the parties.85 Nevertheless, it is 
important to explore this rule in order to have a complete picture of 
the alternatives available to the regulators. 
In particular, unlimited liability towards creditors is simply inadequate 
to address the problems created by SIFIs. SIFIs are not bailed out 
because they impose losses on their creditors, but because they have the 
potential to impose enormous losses onto agents that have not 
contracted with the corporation.86 Unlimited liability towards contract 
creditors would not solve this problem because neither creditors nor 
shareholders would have incentives to account for such externalities. 
At best, unlimited liability towards contract creditors would merely 
constitute a transfer of resources from shareholders to creditors. 
Under limited liability, an insolvent SIFI imposes significant losses on 
its creditors, whereas under an unlimited liability regime, the fact that 
creditors can rely on shareholders’ assets would mitigate these losses. 
Therefore, making shareholders liable towards creditors might reduce 
the risk propensity of shareholders but would also reduce the incentives 
of creditors to monitor the SIFI.87 Thus, this form of unlimited liability 
presents a trade-off in terms of monitoring incentives of shareholders and 
creditors.88 It is unclear whether shareholders are in a better position than 
creditors to monitor the SIFI. Hence, it cannot be predicted whether 
unlimited liability towards creditors would make SIFIs safer. 
At worst, unlimited liability towards creditors would simply achieve 
nothing. Because lending money to SIFIs would become safer, debtors 
would ask for lower interest rates. In turn, this would increase the 
returns to shareholders in good states of the world, which might offset 
their higher expected losses in bad states of the world (i.e., when the 
 
 84. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1919–20. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interests and Ethics When 
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 158 (2009) (noting that the public 
will ultimately bear the profit or loss of a corporation’s risk-taking). 
 87. Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, Reducing Moral Hazard at 
the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the 
Great Depression 2, 5 (Office of Financial Research Research Paper 18-06, 2018) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265163. 
 88. Id. 
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SIFI goes bust). The ability of shareholders and creditors to contract 
around interest rates to account for the level of risk might neutralize 
any substantial effect of extending liability towards creditors. 
Against this background, increasing shareholder liability can only be 
effective if it forces agents with the ability to affect the behavior of the 
SIFI to account for externalities imposed on society at large.89 One 
possible approach, suggested by Conti-Brown, is to make shareholders 
liable for the cost of actual bailouts as an alternative—freely chosen by 
the individual SIFI—to higher capital ratios.90 However, having 
shareholders bear the cost of bailouts creates significant problems. To 
begin with, it would further politicize the debate around bailouts in a 
period of political and economic tension. Some politicians might seize 
the opportunity of earning consent by advocating for very large 
bailouts funded with shareholder money. The narrative of using the 
money of large institutional investors to cover the losses caused by the 
stock market is likely to gain significant traction among a certain part of 
the electorate. Other politicians, instead, would be exposed to the 
political pressure of a relatively small and cohesive group of institutional 
shareholders with a homogeneous interest in minimizing their expected 
liability and hence the size of the bailout. These conflicting political 
interests would generate policy outcomes that would weaken financial 
stability and overall social welfare at a particularly vulnerable moment. 
Furthermore, for a liability rule to provide the right incentives, those 
facing potential liability must be able to affect the probability and the 
dimension of such liability by engaging in monitoring and other risk-
reducing activities. However, in this case, the liability faced by the 
shareholders would largely depend on unpredictable political 
decisions outside their control. As a consequence, they would not be 
able to adopt the optimal precautions to minimize their liability risk. 
Concerns about shareholders’ limited capacity to estimate or to 
control the extent of their future liability prompt objections to the 
imposition of unlimited liability regimes.91 However, this standard 
objection is based on the inability of shareholders sufficiently to 
control the excessive risk-taking proclivities of their own agents, the 
 
 89. Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 206 (arguing that “the externalities of systemic 
failure include social costs that can extend far beyond market participants. Thus, 
market participants will not want to internalize those costs and will take an insufficient 
amount of care to prevent them”). 
 90. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 412–13. 
 91. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 10 (referencing a liability regime where 
shareholders are only liable if they have “capacity to control” their firms). 
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managers of the corporation.92 In this context, shareholders’ inability 
to control the excessive risk-taking that could result in liability is even 
more profound because decisions about whether and how to bailout a 
SIFI depends not on the managers of the SIFI, over whom shareholders 
have some control, but on the government, which is an agent over which 
shareholders’ ability to exercise control is, and should be, attenuated. 
Therefore, making shareholders liable for the portion of harm that 
depends on the reaction of the government would not improve financial 
stability. Rather, it would discourage investment in the financial sector. 
The third option, namely making SIFIs’ shareholders unlimitedly 
liable for torts, would also be unviable. Current tort rules on causation 
and pure economic losses would make an unlimited liability rule largely 
ineffective in inducing SIFIs’ shareholders to internalize the losses caused 
by the distress of their firm. It would also be insufficient to couple 
shareholder liability with a change in tort law that stretches causation to 
allow for recovery of pure economic loss. Allowing the recovery of pure 
economic loss from shareholders would open the door to complex and 
endless litigation and ultimately result in uncertainty. 
A significant part of the harm caused by the distress of a SIFI 
qualifies as what in tort parlance are called “pure economic losses,”93 
which are generally not recognized by the tort system. That is, 
compensation will generally be denied to plaintiffs that are unable to 
establish a direct connection between their physical injury or property 
damage and the acts or omissions of defendants.94 Most of the losses 
 
 92. This argument was frequently embraced by judges who were preoccupied with 
the unfairness of assigning a large liability to shareholders who are not in the “capacity 
to control” or influence the decisions of management. See id. at 9. For an early 
formulation of this view, see Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9, 14 (1819) (“[I]f [a stockholder] 
were equally liable to each holder of the notes (which he must be if liable at all; for if 
the facts agreed create a promise to one, they create a promise to all), then the most 
palpable injustice would take place. For a stockholder, wholly innocent and ignorant 
of the mismanagement, which has brought the bank into discredit, might be ruined 
by reason of owning a single share in the stock of the corporation.”). 
 93. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 46 (2014). See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail. 
Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985) (“[A] virtually per se rule barring recovery for 
economic loss unless the negligent conduct also caused physical harm has evolved 
throughout this century, based, in part, on Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint and 
Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co.” (internal citations omitted)). One recognized 
exception is that of fishermen, as they can recover pure economic losses associated 
with a lost opportunity to fish. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 610 (1999). 
 94. Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure 
Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 773 (2006). 
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that are caused by the distress of a SIFI are likely to be too remote to 
meet the traditional tests for causation required by the law of torts. 
Consider, for instance, the following case. A distressed SIFI cannot 
meet its obligation to pay one of its creditors, say, a carmaker. Hence, 
the carmaker cuts its orders from its supplier, which in turn goes 
bankrupt. Assume also that the carmaker could have kept a steady level 
of production after hearing of the SIFI’s distress by borrowing money 
at higher interest rates. Would the distress of the SIFI be the proximate 
cause of the default of the carmaker’s supplier? It is true that the 
supplier of the carmaker would have not gone bankrupt but for the 
distress of the SIFI, yet there was another event (i.e., the decision of 
the carmaker not to borrow more money) that likely broke the chain 
of causation. Given that the spillovers from a SIFI’s distress will 
propagate through the economy, countless instances akin to the one 
just described are likely to emerge that would fall outside the reach of 
tort law. Denying compensation for pure economic losses and for losses 
that are “remote” would again defeat the purpose of extending 
shareholders’ liability, which is inducing shareholders to account for the 
externalities that a default of their institution would cause on society at 
large. However, allowing plaintiffs to recover losses that are not 
proximately caused by the injurer and pure economic losses means that 
judges would have to develop a whole new set of rules just for dealing with 
SIFIs’ bankruptcies. It is easy to foresee that this process would involve costly 
and complex litigation and generate great uncertainty. Thus, unlimited 
liability seems unworkable with the existing tort rules on harm causation. 
The last option would be making SIFI shareholders liable for all the 
liabilities of their institution, regardless of whether such liabilities are 
contractual in nature. In this vein, shareholders would have to cover 
the losses of the creditors, the cost of the bailout, and any additional 
loss caused by the default of the SIFI for which the SIFI itself is liable 
according to general tort law or other doctrines and rules. In other 
words, this solution would be a “pure” unlimited liability. 
And yet, this solution is not workable either: it compounds the flaws of 
all the forms of unlimited liability analyzed so far while also creating four 
additional problems. First, due to the draconian risk associated with this 
form of shareholders’ liability, it will be difficult if not impossible for SIFIs 
to find equity investors. A lack of investment in them would damage the 
economy because SIFIs, like financial firms more generally, create positive 
externalities by making the allocation of capital within the economy more 
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efficient and moving economic resources to more productive uses.95 As 
Schumpeter noted more than a century ago, “the services provided by 
financial intermediaries—mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, 
managing risk, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions—are 
essential for technological innovation and economic development.”96 A 
large fraction of the benefit created by these activities is thus not 
internalized by financial intermediaries, and it spills over to the most 
productive sectors of the economy.97 While economists have at times 
questioned the idea that financial development can facilitate economic 
growth, “[a] growing body of work would push even most skeptics 
toward the belief that the development of financial markets and 
institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process.”98 
When an activity produces positive externalities, an unlimited 
liability rule thus results in over-deterrence, excessively discouraging 
 
 95. Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 
187, 188 (2000) (“Financially developed countries increase investment more in their 
growing industries and decrease investment more in their declining industries. Thus, 
although financially developed countries might not invest at a higher level they do 
seem to allocate their investment better.” (citations omitted)). 
 96. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 
108 Q.J. ECON. 717, 717 (1993) (describing Schumpeter’s view as expressed in JOSEPH 
A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911) and providing 
empirical evidence in its support). 
 97. The idea that firms produce positive externalities due to their activity and that 
therefore it is important to enhance their ability to attract capital is a traditional 
argument in favor of limited liability. The key role that the financial sector plays in the 
economy further strengthens this argument for SIFIs. For a general formulation of the 
argument see, for example, BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 50–51 
(“[T]here is considerable truth to the widely shared view that limited liability was, and 
remains, essential to attracting the enormous amount of investment capital necessary for 
industrial corporations to arise and flourish. . . . By allowing the public corporation to 
develop, limited liability thus was in large measure responsible for the development of our 
modern economic system.”). For similar arguments, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE 
AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, 54 (1991) (“Limited liability clearly encouraged the flow of 
capital into new enterprise.”); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and 
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1967) (“Limited liability is probably an essential aspect 
of a large corporate system with widespread public participation.”); Jonathan R. Macey, The 
Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 433, 451 (1995) 
(“[G]ranting limited liability helps firms not only to raise capital, but also to encourage 
investments in human and firm-specific capital.”). 
 98. Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 688, 688–89 (1996). 
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parties from engaging in it.99 Consider a simple example. Assume that 
by contributing to the efficient allocation of capital within an economy, 
a SIFI can make profits of $70 and produce a positive externality of 
$40, provided that it does not go bankrupt. Moreover, assume that the 
SIFI has a 50 percent chance of going bankrupt, and that by defaulting 
it would cause a systemic harm equal to $100, for which the SIFI would 
be liable according to general tort law rules. From a social perspective, 
it is optimal if the SIFI engages in its activity because its expected value 
is positive.100 However, under an unlimited liability rule that does not 
account for positive externalities, the SIFI will find it unprofitable to 
conduct its activity. Therefore, unlimited liability would lead financial 
markets to shrink beyond what is optimal. In turn, this might have a 
negative impact on many other sectors of the economy. 
A second drawback of unlimited liability is that it would create the 
perverse incentive of pressuring SIFIs to reduce their equity to the bare 
minimum required by regulation and to limit the extent of potential 
damage by concentrating ownership in the hands of a small number 
of shareholders.101 At present, most SIFIs hold reserves in excess of the 
minimum threshold imposed by the law.102 As unlimited liability 
increases the cost of equity vis-à-vis the cost of debt, it is less likely that 
SIFIs would continue to hold extra reserves if such a rule were passed. 
The third problem with unlimited liability stems from the fact that 
bailouts take place in times of economic tensions; SIFI defaults, if a 
bailout is not engineered, create these tensions. During these times 
policymakers (and, to a lesser degree, courts) are exposed to great 
pressure from various interest groups and public opinion in general. 
As a result, political decisions taken in the proximity of a financial crisis 
 
 99. Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: 
Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 6 (2006) (noting that when an activity produces 
a positive externality the damages should be set below 100 percent). 
 100. The expected value of this activity would be equal to (70 + 40) * 0.5 – 100 * 0.5 = 5. 
Hence, the activity creates a positive value. 
 101. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1886. 
 102. See, e.g., Maheen Khan, Capital and RWA for Tier 1 US Banks–2Q 2018, CLARUS 
FIN. TECH. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.clarusft.com/capital-and-rwa-for-tier-1-us-
banks-2q-2018 [https://perma.cc/9V6G-G9MU] (showing that top U.S. banks all had 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratios well above the statutory minimum at the end of 
the second quarter of 2018, ranging from 11.1 percent for Goldman Sachs to 16.0 
percent for Morgan Stanley, well above the 7 percent minimum). 
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tend to be, “to put it mildly, less than optimal.”103 This is a significant 
drawback of any possible form of the unlimited liability rule because 
the quantification of the harm is bound to be made ex-post (i.e., 
during a time of economic and political tension), and hence to be 
driven by political considerations. In this vein, the amount of liability 
that shareholders will face is unpredictable ex ante and unlikely to be 
an accurate measure of the harm. Consequently, the deterrence effects 
of unlimited liability rules are highly imperfect. 
Finally, perhaps the biggest drawback of a regime of unlimited liability 
as compared with our preferred approach of extended, but bounded, 
liability is that private liability insurance markets would be far more likely 
to emerge to protect investors in bounded liability regimes than in 
unlimited liability regimes. Just as liability insurance is available from 
private carriers in a variety of contexts, such as for officers and directors 
of public companies, we believe that insurance markets would generate 
liability coverage for shareholders facing heightened (but not unlimited) 
liability for the failure of the SIFIs they are invested in. As we further 
argue in Section IV.A, we are dubious that an active or vibrant 
insurance market for such a risk would exist if liability were unlimited 
because of the difficulty of calculating the risks of loss. 
III.    THE PROPOSED EXTENDED LIABILITY RULE 
This Part describes how we propose to shape an extended liability 
rule that accounts for the features of present-day financial markets and 
better serves the goal of neutralizing the moral hazard created by bailout 
expectations. With that goal in mind, we devise a liability regime 
specifically aimed to provide shareholders with greater incentives to 
monitor management so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. Its main 
function is deterrence rather than compensation. The regime we 
envisage is one of SIFI shareholder liability for up to the average share 
price in the period preceding the SIFI’s bailout or orderly liquidation, 
 
 103. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005) (discussing the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act); see A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 
1081–82 (2005) (“Scandal driven reform followed by political neglect has been a 
recurring pattern in the securities markets. . . . That dynamic means that demands for 
financial market regulation will arise in times of crisis. . . . Crisis, however, does not 
create the ideal environment for developing balanced, cost-effective policy 
interventions. Politicians will want to ‘do something,’ even if the proposed something 
may prove to be costly, ineffective or counterproductive.”). 
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with the precise amount depending on the SIFI’s systemic relevance as 
proxied by its position within the financial network. 
A.   The Building Blocks of the Rule 
To define the contours of our proposed extended liability rule for 
SIFI shareholders, we identify and answer seven questions: (1) What 
should be the upper bound to liability? (2) How can the extent of 
liability be made sensitive to the specific systemic relevance of the 
individual SIFI, so that shareholders have greater incentives to monitor 
those SIFIs that endanger the financial system more? (3) What would 
trigger extended SIFI shareholders’ liability? (4) Which shareholders 
should be liable? (5) What should be the standard for liability? (6) How 
would the new rule coordinate with the existing capital requirements 
regime? and (7) Who should recover and where would the money go? 
1. The liability cap 
The basic element of our proposal for an extended liability regime 
is the liability cap, or the maximum amount of liability SIFI shareholders 
should be required to bear. Under the traditional double liability rule, a 
bank’s shareholders were liable in excess to their investment in the bank 
up to the par value of their stocks.104 In today’s markets, the par value is 
no longer a reliable proxy of the value of a firm. It suffices to notice 
that, as of August 6, 2019, the price of Apple shares was $193.34, 
whereas their par value was just $0.00001.105 Hence, the stock price is 
over 19 million times higher than the par value. Similarly, the stock 
price of Goldman Sachs share on the same day was $201.68, whereas 
the par value was just $0.01.106 For that reason, we need to introduce a 
different base to calculate the liability cap. 
While no cap can be devised that will provide for the optimal level 
of shareholder monitoring over excessive risk-taking, we posit that a 
reasonable starting point is the average market price of a common 
stock during the time that goes from thirteen months before 
shareholder liability is triggered (t_13) to one month before that 
(t_1).107 We call the time between t_13 and t_1 the “value window.” The 
advantage of having a value window is threefold. First, the expected 
liability will not be drastically reduced by the unavoidable drop in the 
 
 104. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 31. 
 105. Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 29, 2018). 
 106. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018). 
 107. For the timing of the shareholder liability trigger, see infra Section III.A.3. 
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stock price that precedes a SIFI’s collapse. Second, a value window 
accounts for the fact that the monitoring of SIFIs is an ongoing 
process, and that a default of an institution of this magnitude is 
generally the result of a series of decisions taken during a considerable 
time interval. Recall, for instance, the movie “The Big Short.”108 In 
describing the events that led to the financial crisis, it shows how SIFIs’ 
insiders engaged in reckless behavior for years before the financial 
system collapsed. In fact, over two years passed between the time when 
Michael Burry, the hedge fund manager, first discovered the problems 
with the housing markets and the explosion of the financial crisis. In 
this vein, tying the liability to a specific point in time would be 
unreasonable. Third, with an average of 365 data points, abnormal 
stock price fluctuations will not dramatically affect the expected value 
of the liability. For instance, assume that the price of Bank of America’s 
stocks is equal to $100 for the 365 days of the value window. In this case, 
the base to calculate the expected liability will be $100. Assume now that 
over a single day, the price of Bank of America’s shares doubles. In this 
case, the base to calculate the expected liability will be $100.27.109 This 
stability increases predictability and protects shareholders from 
sudden, extreme changes in stock prices. 
2. The multiplier 
Double liability had the goal of preserving the stability of the single 
bank. Hence, it was reasonable to have a one size-fits-all solution for all 
banks. Our rule’s purpose is, rather, to preserve the stability of the 
financial system, and thus, we introduce a multiplier that reflects the 
risk that the individual SIFI imposes on the system. The advantage of 
using a multiplier is that the extent of liability can be made a function 
of the level of risk posed by the specific SIFI, thereby exposing the 
shareholders of SIFIs that can cause more (less) systemic harm to 
higher (lower) liability. As an outcome, shareholders of more central 
firms will have greater incentives to prevent excessive risk-taking. 
There is ample empirical evidence suggesting that the systemic risk 
posed by an institution depends on its size and its position in the 
financial network.110 Therefore, the multiplier must account for the 
 
 108. THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015). 
 109. If the price of the shares is equal to $100 for the entire year, then the base to 
calculate the liability will be equal to (100 * 365)/365 = $100. Instead, if for one day 
the stock price goes to $200, the base of the liability will be equal to ((100 * 364) + 
(200 * 1))/365 = $100.27. 
 110. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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size of the SIFI and for its centrality, that is, for its systemic relevance. 
Larger and more central institutions pose higher systemic risk, and 
therefore, their shareholders should face higher liability. For these 
reasons, it is useful to define the multiplier in terms of a network-based 
(normalized) indicator of the firm’s systemic relevance, such as the 
DebtRank Score (DRS).111 Imagine that the average stock price of the 
shares over the relevant value window for a given SIFI is $100, and that 
its DRS equals 0.6. Then the liability faced by the shareholder will be 
equal to 100 * (1 + 0.6) = $160.112 Because 0 < DRS < 1, the maximal 
liability that shareholders can face is twice the average price of the 
shares during the value window. 
To be sure, we do not claim that this multiplier leads to optimal 
deterrence. In fact, a risk-averse regulator that wants to further increase 
the incentives of SIFI shareholders to monitor might choose a multiplier 
greater than 1. And yet, even if optimal deterrence is not achieved, it is key 
to adopt a network measure of centrality like the DSR as a multiplier since 
it allows policymakers to connect the liability faced by SIFI shareholders to 
the centrality of their firm. This is important for two reasons. 
First, the goal of the proposed liability rule is countering the 
perverse incentives created by the prospect of bailouts. As the expected 
value of the bailout is higher for firms that are more central, liability 
must also be higher to neutralize the effects on the shareholders. 
Second, the variation in the extent of liability for individual SIFIs 
generated by the DebtRank is especially relevant in a world in which 
large institutional investors own stakes in many SIFIs but have limited 
resources to engage in monitoring. Consider the case in which there 
are three systemically important financial institutions: JP Morgan 
Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America. Assume that a default of 
JP Morgan Chase would take down half of the financial system (i.e., its 
DRS is 0.5), whereas Goldman Sachs and Bank of America would only 
take down one tenth of the financial system (i.e., their DRS is 0.1). Last, 
imagine that mutual funds managed by BlackRock are equally invested 
in these three financial institutions. In a world in which a double 
liability is in place, BlackRock would face equal liability for the default 
 
 111. See Battiston et al., supra note 50; Marco Bardoscia et al., DebtRank: A Microscopic 
Foundation for Shock Propagation, 10(6) PLOS ONE, e0130406, 2015, at 2, 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0130406&type=
printable [https://perma.cc/BNJ3-E2HF] (noting that the original DebtRank helped shift 
attention towards “interconnectedness as a crucial driver of systemic risk”). 
 112. The calculation to determine the liability is 100 * (1 + 0.6) = $160. 
2020] EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 997 
 
of these three banks. Consequently, it will evenly divide the resources 
that it can devote to monitoring among the three institutions. 
However, this outcome is undesirable because JP Morgan Chase can 
cause much larger disruption to the economy, and therefore, it would 
be efficient if BlackRock concentrated a significant part of its resources 
on monitoring JP Morgan. Our rule would lead to this result. In fact, 
the tailored multiplier would cause BlackRock to face liability five 
times higher per dollar invested if JP Morgan Chase goes bankrupt 
than if either Goldman Sachs or Bank of America go bankrupt. For this 
reason, as desired, BlackRock would deploy more resources to 
monitoring JP Morgan Chase. 
Defining the multiplier and the base to calculate the liability this way 
has another fundamental advantage compared to Conti-Brown’s 
proposal:113 it minimizes the role that interest groups and the political 
process play because the criteria to quantify the compensation that 
shareholders have to pay are defined ex ante (i.e., before the distress 
of the SIFI) and are entirely transparent. For this reason, shareholders 
are perfectly able to anticipate the liability they face and to set their 
level of monitoring accordingly. 
3. The trigger 
The most straightforward way to identify the exact moment of the 
extended liability trigger is to refer to the start of the OLA process.114 
The OLA process has its own procedural complexities.115 The first step 
is a determination of systemic risk made by the Federal Reserve Board 
and the FDIC.116 This determination has to be ratified by the Treasury 
Secretary, in consultation with the President.117 Thus, liability could be 
triggered when this procedural process is completed. 
There is, however, one obvious problem with this approach. As 
noted above, the OLA process might be inadequate to cope with the 
problems created by the largest SIFIs or with periods of economic 
 
 113. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 114. Needless to say, an additional trigger would be the entry into a different 
bankruptcy proceeding, such as Chapter 11 or FDIC-led resolution, should the OLA 
procedure not be triggered, and no bailout occur. 
 115. 12 U.S.C. § 5382 (2012). 
 116. Id. § 5383. An exception is if the firm is a broker-dealer or an insurance 
company. Id. In this case, the determination of systemic risk from the FDIC is replaced 
by a vote from either the SEC or the Director of the Federal Insurance Office. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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tension that simultaneously endanger multiple large SIFIs.118 In this 
case, a regulator might be forced to bypass the OLA and opt for a 
bailout. Thus, using the OLA as trigger for the liability rule would have 
the paradoxical result of protecting the shareholders of the largest 
SIFIs from liability. A way to prevent this outcome is for liability to be 
triggered by an OLA determination or government intervention in 
favor of a SIFI in distress. Since the government has multiple ways to 
assist a SIFI (for instance, by issuing guarantees to facilitate the merger 
with a sound bank), it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive 
list of the kinds of interventions that should trigger shareholders’ 
liability. For this reason, we argue that shareholders should be liable 
whenever a government subsidy exceeds a de minimis threshold,119 
independently from the form of the subsidy. 
4. Which liable shareholders? 
One obvious complication is that shares are frequently traded, and 
hence, shareholders will change over time. For this reason, it becomes 
important to define precisely when the liability should kick in to 
determine which individuals or institutions should be liable. Hansmann 
and Kraakman note that two corner solutions are possible. The first, 
which they call the “judgement” rule, attaches liability to the people that 
own shares at the moment in which a judgment is made.120 In this 
context, it would imply that the liability attaches only to the shareholders 
that own the shares at the time of entry into the OLA proceeding or 
the bailout. The obvious problem with this approach is that when there 
are signals that the OLA process or the bailout is approaching, all 
potentially solvent shareholders will have strong incentives to sell their 
share at a very low cost to avoid liability. Another possible approach is 
the so-called “occurrence” rule, under which liability attaches at the 
moment in which the tort occurs.121 This approach means that whoever 
held shares at the moment in which the SIFI made the decisions 
leading to its bankruptcy should be held liable.  This is an unworkable 
solution, however, because, in this context, it is impossible to pinpoint 
a single moment leading to the negative outcome. 
 
 118. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 119. A possible way to determine this threshold is with respect to stock prices. For 
instance, assume that according to the formula discussed in Section III.A.1, the share 
price is $1 and the SIFI issued 100 shares. Then, liability could be triggered whenever 
the subsidy has a value higher than $10, i.e., ten percent of the value of the SIFI. 
 120. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1896. 
 121. Id. 
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We suggest that all the individuals and institutions that held shares 
during the twelve months leading to the OLA or bailout trigger 
(hereinafter, liability window) will be liable in proportion to the value 
of the shares they held, the time during which they held those shares, 
and the multiplier of the SIFI.122 Note that this window is not the same 
as the value window. In fact, while the value window goes from thirteen 
months before the trigger to one month before the trigger, the liability 
window goes from one year before the trigger to the trigger day. The 
liability window also includes the month preceding the OLA trigger 
because we intend to give shareholders incentives to monitor and to 
avoid excessive risk-taking between t_1 and the OLA trigger. 
This mechanism would work as follows: assume that a shareholder 
owned ten shares for the entire liability window and that these shares 
traded on average at $1 each during the value window. Assume also 
that the DRS of this institution is equal to 0.5. Her liability would then 
be equal to $15. Assume now that the same shareholder only held these 
shares for half of the liability window. Her liability would now be equal 
to $7.50. The advantage of this solution is twofold. On the one hand, 
it is hard to evade because divesting right before the OLA process is 
triggered has only a marginal impact on the liability faced by a 
shareholder. On the other hand, such a rule accounts for the fact that 
monitoring of SIFIs to ensure their stability is an ongoing process. In 
addition, it is consistent with the circumstance that a default of an 
institution of this magnitude is generally the result of a series of 
decisions taken during a considerable time interval. 
5. The standard 
Another fundamental aspect of the rule is which liability standard 
should apply. One possibility is to hold shareholders liable only if they 
have been negligent. The main problem with this approach, however, is 
that it would be very hard for courts to determine whether shareholders 
have been negligent in monitoring the manager. Moreover, it is 
 
 122. One possible issue would be hidden ownership, that is, the use of derivatives 
to hold a long position in the SIFI. This practice will not pose a problem if the 
derivative has as a counterparty a financial institution other than the SIFI. In fact, in 
this case, the counterparty holding the shares for hedging purposes will be liable and 
the derivatives contract will deal with the consequences. However, the SIFI itself should 
not be allowed to act as a counterparty to derivatives granting a long position in itself, 
as the SIFI would have to be held liable for its own default. For a discussion of hidden 
ownership, see Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CALIF. L. REV. 811, 836–39 (2006). 
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perfectly possible that some shareholders have been negligent, whereas 
others have monitored carefully. Therefore, courts should make a 
separate negligence finding with respect to each shareholder. Besides 
being costly and time consuming, these negligence findings might 
undermine the deterrent effect if they are—as it is reasonable to 
expect—often inaccurate. On the contrary, a strict liability rule would 
be faster and easy to administer. All shareholders would become liable 
once the OLA procedure is triggered or the bailout executed, 
independently of the level of monitoring in which they had engaged. 
The law and economics literature offers support for the choice of a 
strict liability over a negligence rule.123 In fact, as a rule of thumb, strict 
liability can be desirable when the potential injurers (in our case, the 
shareholders) have better information than the courts on the optimal 
care level to be adopted.124 In this context, it is certainly the case that 
shareholders, and especially sophisticated institutional investors, are 
more informed than the courts on how to monitor managers. 
6. Extended liability and capital structure 
One of the most devastating criticisms raised against the idea of 
increasing shareholders’ liability regards firms’ ability to adjust their 
capital structure.125 Firms are interested in minimizing their overall 
cost of capital and will choose the combination of debt and equity that 
allows them to reach this goal. 126 Unlimited liability of shareholders 
would greatly increase the cost of equity while leaving unchanged the 
cost of debt.127 As a consequence, firms would minimize their 
outstanding equity and switch to an even more highly leveraged capital 
structure.128 To understand this point, imagine a very simple scenario—
in line with the famous framework developed by Modigliani and 
 
 123. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. 
ECON. REV. 363, 363 (1980). 
 124. Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 23 
(1991). Cooter notes that a negligence rule is preferable to strict liability when the 
standard of care that injurers should adopt is knowable by the court. Since, in this case, 
the court cannot determine the standard of care that shareholders should adopt, a 
strict liability rule is preferable. 
 125. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital 
Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 405–06 (1992). 
 126. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 221 (12th ed. 2017). 
 127. Grundfest, supra note 125, at 405. 
 128. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 73. 
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Miller129—in which the cost of debt and equity is identical, and hence, 
the firm will be indifferent between financing itself through debt or 
through equity. However, assume now that an unlimited liability rule 
for shareholders is introduced. The cost of equity will greatly increase 
to reflect the increased risk of liability because shareholders now face 
losses in excess of their investment in the firm. On the contrary, 
creditors’ potential losses are still limited to the amount lent to the firm. 
Hence, the cost of debt will remain constant. The same firm would now 
find it more convenient to increase its leverage and finance a larger part 
of its operation through debt to reduce its expected liability. However, 
as the value of equity shrinks, the expected liability per dollar invested 
in the firm by the equity holders increases. This further tips the balance 
in favor of debt financing, which will shrink the equity cushion even 
more. Thus, the paradoxical outcome of a rule aimed at extending 
shareholders’ liability could be a vicious circle in which firms adjust 
their capital structure so that there will be very little equity to which 
liability can be attached. And as the expected liability associated with 
the remaining equity will be extremely large, the share value will be 
much higher for judgment proof investors. 
For SIFIs, however, the situation is drastically different because the 
regulator has imposed minimum capital requirements. That is, the 
regulator has set a minimum size of the equity cushion in the form of 
capital ratios. Therefore, SIFIs cannot reduce equity beyond a certain 
point.130 Yet, under a rule of unlimited shareholder liability, shareholders 
would have even greater incentives not to go above the regulatory floor, 
which, according to leading economists, is inadequate.131 In other words, by 
increasing the liability exposure of equity capital, higher shareholder liability 
would make financing through debt even more convenient for SIFIs. 
On the contrary, our proposed extended liability regime would induce 
SIFIs to reduce their leverage, without forcing onto them the straitjacket 
of one-size-fits-all capital requirements devised by a regulator that is 
bound to have imperfect information. 
In fact, with a minor tweak, our proposed liability rule can reduce the 
cost of equity vis-à-vis the cost of debt and hence incentivize SIFIs to 
reduce their leverage. In particular, the shareholders should be allowed 
 
 129. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) 
(discussing the cost of capital for a firm that can obtain capital from many sources). 
 130. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 131. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 28, at 179. 
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to reduce their liability by increasing the SIFI’s equity cushion. That is, 
shareholders should have to bear the full extended liability only if their 
capital exactly matches the mandated capital ratios. Any increase in tier-
one capital held in excess to the capital requirement would generate a 
proportional reduction of the extended liability. For instance, assume 
that the capital requirement of a SIFI is 8 percent, and that the SIFI 
holds exactly 8 percent in tier one capital. The SIFI shareholders would 
then have to cover the extended liability in full. If the SIFI has an extra 
4 percent of equity cushion, then the extended liability will be halved. 
In this vein, the shareholders will return to a regime of single liability 
if their SIFI has an equity cushion that is twice as large as the one 
mandated (in this example, 16 percent). 
It is easy to see why this feature of our rule allows shareholders to 
reduce their liability by reducing leverage. Returning to the example, 
assume that now the SIFI—with an equity cushion of 12 percent—needs 
fresh money and must decide whether to issue bonds or raise new equity. 
In the former case, the basis on which liability is calculated would increase. 
On the opposite, if new equity is issued, the basis on which liability is 
calculated would decrease and the expected liability would be discounted 
by the amount of capital held in excess over the capital requirement. 
With this tweak, our proposal would share with Conti-Brown’s the feature 
of granting shareholders the right to decide on the extent of their own 
liability.132 However, under his proposal, shareholders can only decide 
between a very high capital requirement or unlimited liability. Instead, our 
rule grants shareholders a much wider choice because it allows them to 
choose the combination of liability and capital requirement that they prefer 
within the parameters set by the regulator. 
7. Collecting from shareholders 
The goal of our proposed rule is deterrence. Hence, who gets the 
money is a second order problem. However, one obvious possibility is 
that the money collected goes to, and is collected by, the FDIC, as a 
reserve to be used to fund either payouts to depositors of failed banks 
or bridge financing within OLA proceedings.133 Another possibility is 
 
 132. See supra text preceding note 59. 
 133. In an OLA resolution, the bridge bank used to temporarily transfer a bank’s 
assets and liabilities to ensure continuity can be financed via a credit line drawn from 
the Treasury. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the 
European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1297, 1311–12 (2015). The funds recovered from shareholders could be used 
in future OLA resolutions as funding for the same purposes. 
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that the funds are collected directly by the government to (partially) 
cover the cost of the bailout. 
IV.    MARKET ADAPTIONS TO AN EXTENDED LIABILITY REGIME 
Having laid the foundations of our proposed extended liability rule in 
the previous section, in this Part, we explain how the market would adjust 
to the new liability rule, in particular by focusing on: (1) how the risks of 
incurring extended liability for SIFI failures would be shifted to insurance 
companies and derivative counterparties because insurance and derivative 
products would emerge to shoulder the risk of such extended liability in 
exchange for compensation for doing so; (2) how our rule is going to affect 
the composition of SIFIs’ shareholder base; and (3) how our liability rule 
would ameliorate the problem of firms being too big to manage. 
A.   Insurance Markets for Extended Liability Exposure 
In his provocative article advocating for an unlimited liability regime 
for SIFIs’ shareholders, Conti-Brown argued that the “greatest feature” 
of this regime is that it would result in the creation of a new form of 
derivative instrument that would effectively shift the risk of unlimited 
liability from shareholders to derivative counterparties.134 Specifically, 
Conti-Brown envisages the introduction of a particular derivative—the 
shareholder liability swap (SLS)—that would work, much like a credit 
default swap (CDS), as follows: 
The issuer would guarantee to pay the holder of equity . . . enough 
to cover any losses following a taxpayer bailout. In this sense, an SLS 
is similar to a credit default swap (CDS), which pays a bondholder 
the value of a bond in the event the issuer of the bond defaults.135 
The advantage of a SLS would be twofold. First, the value of the SLS 
would serve as a signal of the solvency of the institution. Currently, the 
two most accredited indicators of a firm solvency are the ratings issued 
by credit rating agencies (CRAs) and CDSs. CRAs tend to react to 
mutated circumstances at a much slower speed than the market.136 
CDSs, in turn, are insensitive to the risk of a bailout because a bailout 
usually prevents a default; in other words, CDSs, unlike SLSs, 
underestimate the solvency risk of too-big-to-fail SIFIs. Building on 
this, Conti-Brown argues that variations in the price of SLS would serve 
 
 134. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 439. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads 
as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2106 (2010). 
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as a useful tool to “determine the likelihood of a government 
bailout.”137 Second, shareholders could distribute the risk posed by the 
default of their SIFI by buying SLS from agents that are in a better 
position to bear that risk. 
The extended liability regime that we propose improves on this 
important ancillary element of Conti-Brown’s proposal. The price of a 
SLS under Conti-Brown’s unlimited liability rule would not depend only 
on the likelihood of a default, but also on the estimated value of the 
liability given default. The latter, however, is the result of the idiosyncratic 
political reaction to a situation of crisis and hence is hard to estimate for 
market participants. To put it differently, the probability of default of an 
institution is a risk (i.e., a form of “randomness whose probabilistic nature 
is extremely familiar and can be characterized with objective 
probabilities”138), whereas the cost of a SIFI bailout and hence the extent 
of the expected liability, is uncertain (i.e., characterized by “randomness 
whose probabilistic behavior is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, or even 
unknowable”139). Thus, the price of a derivative that accounts for the 
estimated value of the liability given default is bound to be an extremely 
noisy signal of the probability of SIFI default. Similarly, because it would 
be based on an event characterized by uncertainty, the SLS would be a 
poor mechanism to distribute risk in the market.140 
 
 137. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 439. 
 138. Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 755, 759 (2009). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, On the Role of Insurance Brokers in 
Resolving the Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN, 
AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT: MEASUREMENT AND THEORY 
ADVANCING PRACTICE 194, 194 (Francis X. Diebold, Neil A. Doherty & Richard J. 
Herring eds. 2010). As Doherty and Muermann stated: 
Insurance [in this case, the SLS] transfers risk, and the knowledge of the level 
of risk is important to the parties in deciding whether to engage in this activity. 
Without knowledge of the underlying loss distribution, the insurer [i.e. the 
buyer of the SLS] will find it difficult to set a price and the policyholder [i.e. 
the shareholder] is unable to tell whether he is getting a good price from the 
insurer. 
Id.; see also Michael Simkovic, Limited Liability and the Known Unknown, 68 DUKE L.J. 275, 
309 (2018) (“Insurers generally prefer to underwrite insurance for well-understood, 
specific, and readily quantifiable risks for which historical data is available−that is, risks 
that resemble those that have materialized in the past.”). In this case, markets would 
be much more familiar with estimating the probability of default of an institution than 
with predicting policymakers’ reactions to a financial crisis. 
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On the contrary, under our proposed extended liability regime, the 
value of a SLS would depend only on the probability of default because 
the amount of liability is clearly defined ex ante. Therefore, under our 
rule, the SLS would be more effective at distributing risk and would 
constitute a more reliable and transparent signal of a SIFI’s solvency. 
Moreover, under a liability regime like the one we propose, an 
insurance market and/or a derivatives market for shifting extended liability 
risk would be highly likely to emerge. Such markets would have structural 
characteristics similar to those of the robust municipal bond insurance 
market or the CDS market that currently exist.141 Were such markets to 
develop, then either the SIFI would contract and pay for insurance that 
would pay out the additional money owed by investors in case of default or 
individual investors could buy their own policies or derivative contracts. 
Moreover, as with municipal bond insurance, once an investor’s 
extended liability is insured, the performance of the SIFI will be closely 
monitored by its insurer through a process known as “surveillance” in 
the municipal bond context.142 The insurance company would be 
specialized in monitoring SIFIs’ behavior and therefore in a good 
position to identify excessively risky conducts. SIFIs would therefore be 
penalized for engaging in excessively risky activities because their 
insurance premiums would go up. Further, the regulator itself would 
have an additional market signal to act upon before it is too late. 
 
 
 
 
 
 141. Under our proposal, insurance companies would have a contractual obligation 
to pay claims to shareholders/policyholders if a default or bailout of a SIFI triggered 
an extended liability payment. Where the insurance for SIFI default would pay the 
extended liability obligations of SIFI shareholders, similar to municipal bond 
insurance companies when municipalities default on their obligations to pay principal 
and interest on their outstanding bonds. What Does Municipal Bond Insurance Cover?, 
MORNINGSTAR (2015), http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId= 
5399&page=3 [https://perma.cc/LF7N-3L6S]. In particular, when a municipality 
defaults on its debt, the municipal bond insurance company becomes obligated to 
make the requisite principal and interest payments to investors in a timely fashion. Id. 
Insurance companies usually insure only municipal bonds with credit ratings of BBB 
or higher. Id. Insurance policies also are available for municipal bond funds. Id. 
 142. See How Municipal Bonds Are Insured?, MORNINGSTAR (2015), http://news. 
morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=5399&page=4&CN=sample 
[https://perma.cc/BFP7-4EW4]. 
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B.   Extended Liability and SIFIs’ Ownership 
In general, by increasing the liability faced by the shareholders, our 
proposed rule increases the incentives of market participants to 
engage in monitoring.143 However, it is important to understand in 
greater detail how our proposal would affect asset managers, given 
their key role in today’s equity market. The first question to address is: 
who should be liable? The funds that hold the shares (e.g., Fidelity 
Magellan Fund), the advisor that manages the funds (e.g., Fidelity), or 
both? We suggest that the advisor and the funds should be held jointly 
liable. The reason is that the former has the skills and the competences 
to engage in monitoring, whereas the latter has the resources to cover 
the liability. If the liability were placed only on asset managers, then 
they would be incentivized to hold less assets, thus potentially creating 
a judgment-proof problem. At the same time, funds themselves do not 
have the resources and the expertise that are necessary to monitor 
their portfolio firms. In this vein, making them liable might produce 
limited benefits in terms of increased monitoring. 
But how would this liability rule change the incentives of asset 
managers? To answer this question, leaving aside the problem of how 
to transition to the new regime,144 one must consider that under our 
extended liability regime, the price of SIFI shares will be affected by 
exactly the same factors that are influencing prices in its absence, but 
with one significant exception: changes in the stability of the SIFI will 
have a larger impact on share prices. In this vein, investors that have 
the ability to monitor their portfolio companies and more specifically 
to influence their management so as to prevent excessive risk-taking 
will find SIFI shares attractive. In fact, by increasing the safety and 
soundness of the SIFIs they invest in, such investors could reduce 
insurance premiums and ultimately increase share prices. 
Of course, we recognize that not all shareholders are equally well 
equipped to engage in the monitoring of SIFIs. Indeed, we believe that 
there will be vast heterogeneity among the potential shareholding 
population with respect to their monitoring capabilities. In particular, 
under our proposal, passivity will be riskier for investors (including but 
not limited to those who invest in index funds as well as professionally 
managed mutual funds that have made a determination to remain 
 
 143. If an SLS market emerges, such monitoring will be conducted by the swap 
counterparties. If no SLS or insurance market emerges, then the investors who face 
extended liability will have the incentive to monitor. 
 144. See infra Section V.C. 
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passive). We believe that this increased risk is actually an attractive 
feature of our extended liability proposal for two reasons. First, as 
noted in the previous section, the existence of derivatives and the 
emergence of private insurance coverage for extended liability will 
shift most, and possibly all, of the risk of our proposal onto derivative 
and insurance company counterparties. This risk-shifting will 
ameliorate the risk to passive investors that hold stock in SIFIs directly 
or through mutual funds, or investors that otherwise choose to remain 
rationally ignorant and passive about the levels of risk-taking actually 
going on within particular financial institutions. However, we recognize 
that under our proposal, investors would still experience extended 
liability for SIFI losses if the SIFIs in which they invested failed and their 
insurers and/or derivative counterparties also failed. Because of this risk, 
we acknowledge that our proposal would make investing in SIFIs less 
attractive for passive investors. But at the same time, it would make 
investing in SIFIs more attractive for active, sophisticated investors 
because it would increase the expected returns associated with locating 
arbitrage opportunities in SIFIs that are less risky than they are 
perceived to be in the market. The added risk of incremental liability 
from our proposal would have the effect of magnifying the available 
arbitrage opportunities beyond what they would be under the current 
system of limited liability and anticipated government bailouts. 
C.   Too Big to Manage 
According to many commentators, large banks are not only too big to 
fail but also too big to manage.145 The basic argument is that it is very hard 
for executives, boards, and shareholders to oversee large banks with 
hundreds of thousands of employees.146 The main issue is that the 
activities of banks, and especially of the largest institutions, are incredibly 
complex and opaque.147 Therefore, even assuming that they have the best 
intentions, managers and shareholders might not be able to manage a 
 
 145. See generally Jeremy C. Kress, Solving Banking’s ‘Too Big to Manage’ Problem, 104 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the most prominent proposals to 
reduce the size of banks all suffer from shortcomings). 
 146. See Julian Birkinshaw & Suzanne Heywood, Too Big to Manage?, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 26, 2009). 
 147. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Bank Corporate Governance: A 
Proposal for the Post-Crisis World, 22 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 85, 90 (2016) 
(noting that “[t]he opacity of bank activities, combined with the complexity of risk 
management activities involving the valuation and control of complex asset positions, 
creates significant monitoring difficulties”). 
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SIFI’s risk exposure.148 The problem significantly worsens when one 
considers that managers’ incentives are further skewed toward risk-taking 
by the typical compensation contracts in the banking sector.149 
Against this background, one could argue that shareholders would 
have incentives to push toward shrinking the size of their SIFI in order 
to minimize the risk of losses. However, as noted in Section II.A, SIFIs’ 
shareholders enjoy an implicit subsidy, which protects them from 
possible losses because their firm is too big to fail. Thus, they have no 
incentives to break up their SIFI, despite the fact that this would 
facilitate their monitoring. Our liability rule would address this 
problem as well. By increasing shareholder exposure to downside risk, 
our proposal gives shareholders stronger incentives to ensure that the 
SIFI becomes of the “optimal” size. That is, sufficiently big to enjoy the 
relevant economies of scale that are associated with high volumes of 
activity but also not so large that it becomes impossible to monitor. 
V.    WHY STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO UNLIMITED LIABILITY DO NOT 
APPLY 
Since Hansmann and Kraakman’s seminal article,150 any proposal to 
extend shareholder liability must wrestle with five standard objections: (1) 
firms would just finance themselves through debt instead of equity; (2) 
shareholders do not have the ability to monitor; (3) an extended liability 
rule would result in shares being held by judgment proof shareholders; (4) 
it is hard to collect from offshore investors; and (5) it is hard to define when 
the liability attaches. We have already dealt with points (1) and (5) in 
Section III.A. The fourth objection loses most of its bite in the face of the 
explosion of international arbitration. Here, we also show that the second 
and third objections are, respectively, no longer valid following the 
reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors that 
has taken place in the last thirty years and is easy to address. Moreover, it is 
important to remark that extending liability will impose a loss on the 
existing shareholders. And while it is appropriate that the cost of equity 
incorporates the risk posed by the firm,151 it is still desirable to compensate 
shareholders that hold shares during the transition period. We discuss how 
this compensation can be carried out in Section V.C. 
 
 148. Kress, supra note 145, at 17. 
 149. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247, 255 (2010) (discussing bankers’ incentives to take excessive risks). 
 150. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18. 
 151. Id. at 1903. 
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A.   Shareholders’ Monitoring 
One of the most convincing arguments against unlimited liability is 
that shareholders would not be able to effectively monitor the behavior 
of their firm independently from the amount of liability to which they 
are exposed simply because they lack the required competences.152 
However, such an argument has lost most of its bite due to the 
transition from the Berle-Means corporation, characterized by diffuse 
ownership, to present-day institutional ownership.153 In fact, unlike 
small retail shareholders, large and sophisticated institutional 
investors, such as Fidelity, Capital Research, and T. Rowe Price, have 
the resources and the know-how to monitor management provided 
that they are given sufficient incentives to do so.154 
A related critique of unlimited liability is that an investor would have 
to monitor the wealth of other shareholders because if the latter is 
insolvent, the investor would be exposed to higher liability.155 However, 
 
 152. This argument was frequently embraced by judges that were concerned with 
the unfairness of assigning a large liability to shareholders who are not in the “capacity 
to control” or influence the decisions of the management. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 
9. For an early formulation of this view, see Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9, 14 (1819) (“[I]f [a 
stockholder] were equally liable to each holder of the notes (which he must be if liable at 
all; for if the facts agreed create a promise to one, they create a promise to all), then the 
most palpable injustice would take place. For a stockholder, wholly innocent and ignorant 
of the mismanagement, which has brought the bank into discredit, might be ruined by 
reason of owning a single share in the stock of the corporation.”). 
 153. At the time of the debate sparked by Hansmann and Kraakman’s article, 
Grundfest noted that “[r]elatively few institutions hold as much as one percent of any 
issuer’s shares.” Grundfest, supra note 125, at 396. Instead, large institutional investors 
hold a much higher stake in many corporations. See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. 
Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, 
Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 312 
(2017) (showing that Fidelity, Capital Research, and T. Rowe Price, some of the largest 
U.S. active managers, as of March 2016, held stakes higher than five percent in 1309, 
528, and 399 companies across the world, respectively). 
 154. See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual 
Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting that institutional 
investors “know what information to ask for. They know what it means. And they hold 
sufficiently large stakes to care”). 
 155. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 95 (1985) (“[L]imited liability reduces the costs of monitoring 
other shareholders. Under a rule exposing equity investors to additional liability, the 
greater the wealth of other shareholders, the lower the probability that any one 
shareholder’s assets will be needed to pay a judgment. Thus existing shareholders 
would have incentives to engage in costly monitoring of other shareholders to ensure 
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this problem only arises if shareholders are jointly liable,156 whereas 
under our rule, each shareholder can only be asked to pay in accordance 
to the formula described in Section III.A. Therefore, the expected 
liability of one shareholder is not affected by the wealth of the other. 
B.   Judgment Proof 
The key argument behind the idea of unlimited liability is that it will 
induce shareholders to monitor the firm more carefully and will lower 
stock prices to reflect the expected value of liability.157 Yet, increasing 
shareholders’ liability cannot have these effects if the shareholders are 
judgment proof. At the extreme, a shareholder that has invested all her 
assets in a corporation will be indifferent between an unlimited liability 
rule and the current regime of limited liability. While it is extremely 
unlikely that the judgment-proof problem affecting shareholders is this 
severe, the key idea that high levels of liability cannot influence the 
behavior of shallow-pocket shareholders remains. However, this problem 
would be significantly less severe under our rule than under unlimited 
liability, especially given the current ownership structure of SIFIs. 
In particular, under this rule the maximum liability would be twice the 
shareholder’s investment (when DRS = 1). It is implausible that investors 
are undiversified to the point of placing more than half of their assets in a 
single SIFI. Nowadays, the vast majority of the shares are held by large 
institutional investors. Our proposed extended liability rule will not 
bankrupt these investors because they can hedge this risk via a SLS.158 
In any event, because the liability cap is clearly spelled out ex ante, it 
is easy to prevent deep-pocketed investors from passing their shares to 
shallow-pocket ones before liability is triggered. Assume that there are 
two individuals, A and B, and that A is a deep-pocketed shareholder, 
whereas B owns no assets. A might have incentives to park A’s shares with 
B in order to escape liability. The following rule may prevent this 
outcome. If B reports the scheme, A will have to pay treble damages, 
 
that they do not transfer assets to others or sell to others with less wealth. Limited 
liability makes the identity of other shareholders irrelevant and thus avoids these 
costs.”). 
 156. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1565, 1578 (1991). 
 157. Grundfest, supra note 125, at 389 (explaining that unlimited liability can only 
be effective if it “will cause stock prices to decline in a manner rationally related to the 
business risks and capital adequacy, including insurance, of the underlying 
enterprise”). 
 158. See, e.g., Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 153, at 304. 
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two-thirds of which will go to B. Let us return to the example presented 
in the introduction in which the expected liability equals $160. If B 
reports the scheme, A will be required to pay $480, of which B will 
pocket $320. The optimal strategy for B would then be accepting to 
hold A’s shares and then report A. Thus, A will have no incentives to 
transfer shares to B in the first place. 
One obvious problem is that it would be possible to create limited 
liability companies with limited assets to hold SIFI shares.159 To prevent 
this, it is important that these companies’ corporate veils can be pierced, 
but only up to a value sufficient to cover the liability obligation of the 
shareholders that derive from the default of a SIFI. In other words, 
assume that Apple owns shares in JP Morgan Chase. To avoid liability, 
Apple might create a company with limited assets—call it Rotten 
Apple—to which it could contribute its JP Morgan Chase’s shares. While 
for any other liability we argue that the standard veil-piercing doctrines 
should apply to Rotten Apple, for the liability associated with JP 
Morgan Chase’s default, the veil should automatically be pierced so 
that Apple is liable. 
C.   Transitioning to the New Regime: Compensating Existing SIFI 
Shareholders 
Implementing the proposed reform might create a transition problem. 
Specifically, if a law were passed imposing extended liability, anyone 
holding shares in a SIFI at the time it entered into force would experience 
a sudden decline in share value as share prices adjusted to reflect the new, 
greater risk associated with owning shares in SIFIs. And while the very 
purpose of increasing the liability faced by shareholders is to ensure that 
the equity price adequately accounts for the risk posed by the 
corporation,160 it might be problematic to impose losses on shareholders 
that purchased the shares when the rule of the game was limited liability. 
A possible solution would be compensating shareholders for the loss 
caused by the increased liability. In the U.S. context, shareholders could 
be compensated from payments from the FDIC deposit insurance fund. 
While compensating shareholders for the transition from limited 
liability to extended liability seems desirable, it is important to carefully 
consider how to define the quantum of the compensation. For instance, 
if the compensation is determined ex ante by the regulator based on 
an estimation of the price drop, then it is bound to be inaccurate and 
 
 159. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 434. 
 160. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1903. 
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arbitrary. At the same time, calculating compensation based on the 
observed price drop between pre-liability (say, tpre) and post-liability 
(say, tpost) would also be problematic. First, it is hard to identify tpre. 
Because investors will foresee that the liability rule will change, the 
stock prices will begin to drop even before the law is enacted. Second, 
basing compensation on the observed price drop would incentivize 
shareholders to take on excessive risk during the transition period. In 
fact, if the shareholders bet strong on risky projects and these projects 
prove to be successful, the stock price of their company will increase, 
and they will benefit. Instead, if these risky projects fail, the 
shareholders would be able to externalize the losses to the FDIC. 
Simply put, the shareholders would be able to play a “heads I win; tails 
[the FDIC] loses” game.161 Third, the riskiest SIFIs will face a larger 
price drop, and paradoxically, under this rule, their shareholders 
would also be the ones that receive the largest compensation. 
A way out of this impasse would be structuring a mechanism akin to 
an auction among SIFIs. Contrary to normal auctions, we suggest a 
mechanism of descending prices. In our context, the auction would 
work as follows: first, the regulator imposes a ceiling for the 
compensation, say 10 percent of the market value of a SIFI before the 
rule was first discussed. This ceiling is likely to be inaccurate for the 
reasons highlighted above. Yet, because it is only needed to start the 
auction, its accuracy is less important. At this point, the shareholders 
of each SIFI will be asked to state the lowest percentage of the ceiling 
that they would be willing to accept. The compensation will then be set 
at the percentage offered by the SIFI that wins the auction (i.e., that 
offered the lowest percentage). To incentivize SIFIs to offer low 
percentages, the winner of the auction could be awarded an additional 
compensation, say 50 percent more than the percentage offered. To 
exemplify, assume that there are three SIFIs: Bank of America, JP 
Morgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs. Assume also that Bank of America 
offers to accept 50 percent of the ceiling, JP Morgan Chase 30 percent, 
and Goldman Sachs 10 percent. The compensation received by the 
three SIFIs will be 10 percent of the ceiling because it was the lowest 
bid. However, Goldman Sachs would receive 15 percent of the ceiling. 
In addition to solving the problem of determining the price drop, 
this mechanism would have an important advantage. As noted above, 
 
 161. Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 448 (1995) (formulating a similar claim with respect to limited 
liability in general). 
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the new liability rule will have a lower impact on the share price of safer 
SIFIs. For this reason, the safest SIFI would be more likely to place the 
winning bid and receive the added compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The dramatic consequences of the last financial crisis are a painful 
reminder of why we should prevent SIFIs from taking on excessive risk. 
However, the complexity and the size of these financial giants make it 
impossible for policymakers to craft regulations that can effectively 
constrain SIFIs’ risk-taking. For this reason, this Article suggests that 
policymakers should also directly tackle the incentives of their 
shareholders and reduce their risk propensity. 
We have argued that policymakers can achieve this goal by 
abandoning the current rule limiting the liability of SIFI shareholders 
to the amount of their investment, thus increasing SIFIs’ shareholder 
exposure to downside risk. In itself, this proposal is only partly new, since 
for three quarters of a century, roughly between the Civil War and the 
Great Depression, the shareholders of U.S. banks were subject to double 
liability. The characteristics of present-day financial markets—the 
presence of capital ratios for financial institutions, the dominance of 
institutional share ownership, and the availability of well-developed 
insurance and derivatives markets—create the perfect conditions for 
implementing a modified version of the traditional double liability rule. 
More precisely, we propose that SIFI shareholders face extended liability, 
up to twice the average share price in a twelve-month period prior to the 
SIFI’s default or bailout, depending on the SIFI’s systemic relevance. This 
would strengthen shareholders’ incentives to monitor SIFIs and prevent 
them from engaging in excessively risky, socially harmful conducts. 
